Overview and Central Argument

Tamseel Aqdas's paper argues that Turkey under Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has undertaken a deliberate, multi-decade pivot away from its Cold War-era role as a Western-anchored NATO member and toward an independent foreign policy modeled on the historical reach of the Ottoman Empire. The paper's core thesis is that this "neo-Ottomanism" is not merely nostalgic rhetoric but a strategic project — one designed to exploit the erosion of U.S. unipolarity, the rise of China and Russia, and the symbolic opening created by the 2023 expiration window associated with the Treaty of Lausanne. The author frames Turkey's behavior as a case study in how a middle power positions itself for "strategic autonomy" inside a fraying liberal international order, using energy politics, military intervention, and civilizational/religious identity as levers.

Key Supporting Pillars

The paper organizes its argument around several reinforcing strands of evidence:

1. Historical framing. The paper roots Erdoğan's ambitions in the memory of the Ottoman Empire's territorial peak under Suleiman the Magnificent, and the empire's subsequent collapse and territorial reduction under the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne. This historical arc is used to explain why "restoring lost glory" carries such domestic political resonance — the Lausanne settlement is treated as a wound that Erdoğan's government frames itself as capable of reversing, symbolically if not literally.

2. A two-phase foreign policy shift. The analysis distinguishes an earlier AKP-era approach built on economic interdependence, soft power, and even EU accession talks, from a later and more assertive phase defined by coercive diplomacy and direct military intervention (Syria, Libya, Nagorno-Karabakh-adjacent posturing, and Eastern Mediterranean energy disputes). This periodization is one of the paper's stronger structural choices, since it shows the shift as gradual rather than sudden, tied to material triggers like the 2016 coup attempt and worsening EU relations.

3. Diversification toward Russia and China. Considerable space is devoted to quantifying Turkey's economic and security realignment — rising trade volumes with China (from roughly $1.6 billion in 2002 to $22 billion by 2020), the purchase of Russian S-400 missile systems despite NATO objections, and growing Black Sea Economic Cooperation ties with Russia. The paper treats these data points as evidence that Turkey is hedging against, rather than abandoning, its Western relationships — since it simultaneously maintains a $143 billion trade relationship with the EU.

4. Regional power projection. Turkey's interventions in Syria (against Kurdish forces and ISIS-adjacent threats), Libya (backing the Government of National Accord against Khalifa Haftar in exchange for a maritime EEZ agreement), and its unilateral exploration of Black Sea gas reserves are presented as concrete instruments of the neo-Ottoman strategy — not just security responses but tools for expanding zones of Turkish economic and political influence.

5. Positioning as leader of the Muslim world. The paper highlights Erdoğan's rhetoric on Jerusalem/Al-Aqsa, his criticism of India's policies in Kashmir, and his advocacy for Palestinians even while normalizing ties with Israel. This is framed as an attempt to build legitimacy across the Muslim-majority world at a moment when traditional Arab leadership (particularly Saudi Arabia's) is seen as weakened or compromised by normalization with Israel.

6. Constraints and countervailing pressures. To its credit, the paper does not present Turkey's rise as unconstrained. It acknowledges that U.S. sanctions (post-S-400), suspected U.S. sympathy for the 2016 coup attempt, Turkey's chronic economic fragility (inflation, currency depreciation, earthquake recovery costs), and continued economic dependence on the EU all act as brakes on the neo-Ottoman project. The conclusion explicitly recommends that Turkey pursue autonomy "through diplomacy and pragmatism" rather than confrontation, given its economic vulnerabilities.

Strengths of the Analysis

The paper's greatest strength is its use of concrete economic indicators (trade volumes, tourism numbers, investment figures) to substantiate what could otherwise be a purely rhetorical argument about identity and ideology. By tying neo-Ottomanism to measurable shifts in trade and defense procurement, the author avoids treating the concept as an abstraction and instead shows it operating through real policy instruments. The historical section also does useful work establishing why the 1923 treaty functions as a live political symbol in Turkey rather than a settled historical fact.

Weaknesses and Points of Caution

Several issues deserve scrutiny. First, the paper repeatedly references a "2023 termination of the Treaty of Lausanne," treating this as a settled trigger event. In fact, the treaty contains no sunset clause, and the "100-year expiration" narrative is a popularized claim within Turkish nationalist discourse rather than a documented legal event — this is a significant factual weakness that undermines the paper's causal framing, since much of the argument's timing hinges on it.
Second, the sourcing is thin and repetitive: a small number of secondary sources (particularly Kutlay and Öniş, and Yapar) are cited dozens of times, with few primary sources, official statements, or opposing scholarly viewpoints. This narrows the analysis and makes it harder to assess whether "neo-Ottomanism" is a widely accepted framework among Turkey scholars or a more contested one — the paper would benefit from engaging critics who argue Erdoğan's foreign policy is better explained by pragmatic nationalism, domestic electoral incentives, or reactive improvisation rather than a coherent civilizational project.
Third, the paper sometimes conflates correlation with strategy — for instance, presenting the Turkey-Israel rapprochement and continued pro-Palestinian rhetoric as evidence of calculated positioning, when it could equally reflect contradictory pressures rather than deliberate design.

Conclusion

Overall, the paper offers a coherent and reasonably well-evidenced account of Turkey's foreign policy trajectory under Erdoğan, successfully linking historical memory, economic diversification, and regional military assertiveness under the single interpretive frame of "neo-Ottomanism." Its analytical value would be strengthened by more rigorous sourcing, a clearer distinction between confirmed treaty provisions and popularized nationalist narrative, and engagement with alternative explanations for Turkish foreign policy behavior beyond the neo-Ottoman thesis.